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§ 
Bybee was correctly convicted of contempt 
because the definition of joint legal custody is a "clear and unequivocal command that the parties 
must at a minimum discuss matters relating to health, education, and general welfare of their 
children." (Resp't Br. 5.) This argument is wrong because: (1) I.C. § 32-717B(3) is not a 
"judgment, order or process of the court," and (2) LC. § 32-717B(3) does not clearly and 
unequivocally proscribe Ms. Bybee's alleged misconduct. 
A. The definition of "Joint Legal Custody" at I. C. § 32-7 l 7B(3) is not a command of the 
court and cannot be enforced pursuant to LC. § 7-601(5). 
Mr. Thompson prosecuted Ms. Bybee on the theory that she disobeyed "a lawful 
judgment, order or process of the court." LC. § 7-601 (5). As previously argued in Appellant's 
Brief, the plain language of the Order's joint legal custody award does not command the parties 
to do or refrain from doing anything. It appears that Mr. Thompson concedes this point and 
instead argues that Ms. Bybee was properly held in contempt because the definition of joint legal 
custody, codified at I.C. § 32-717B(3 ), is itself a clear and unequivocal command of the court. 
(Resp 't Br. 5.) 
Mr. Thompson fails to cite to any authority for the novel proposition that LC. § 32-
717B(3) is a "lawful judgment, order or process of the court" rather than a creation of the 
legislature. The only support Mr. Thompson draws upon is the following slippery slope fallacy: 
"If Ms. Bybee's position were taken to its local conclusion, one could not be 
found in contempt unless each word used in an order or judgment were defined, 
and/or the entire universe of potential issues and decisions that impact a child's 
health, education or general welfare were defined in an order or judgment for a 
party to the agreement to have any contempt remedy." 
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possibility that the verbatim definition of joint legal custody could easily be written directly 
into the Order and supplant the ineffectual "award" of joint legal custody. Nonetheless, the 
magistrate agreed with Mr. Thompson, (Tr. p.56, Ls.10-25-p.57, Ls.1-10) as did the district 
court. (R.98.) 
The rulings of the lower courts undermine Idaho's bright-line rule that a respondent 
carmot be held in contempt unless the court order actually commands or enjoins specific conduct. 
Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC v. Keane, 154 Idaho 807, 303 P.3d 166 (2013); Albrethson v. Ensign, 32 
Idaho 687, 186 P.911 (1920). If adopted, these rulings would create a loophole in existing case 
law whereby a respondent could be convicted of violating a court order that does not contain a 
command, so long as the order employs a term of art that is defined by statute in such a way that 
it can be construed as a command. Whether someone could be held in contempt in such cases 
would then tum on the manner in which the legislature drafted the statute. Idaho Code § 7-
601 ( 5) punishes violations of court orders-not state statutes-and court orders cannot be 
"expanded by implication or intendment." Terminal R. Ass 'n of St. Louis v. United States, 266 
U.S. 17, 29, 45 S.Ct. 5, 8 (1924). This Court should vacate the judgment of the district court 
simply because the allegedly-violated provision of the Order does not command the parties to do 
or refrain from doing anything. 
B. The definition of "Joint Legal Custody" at LC. § 32-717B(3) does not clearly and 
unequivocally prohibit Ms. Bybee's alleged misconduct. 
Assuming arguendo that the court's award of joint legal custody implicitly commands the 
parties to "share the decision-making responsibilities and authority to the ... 
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If LC. § 32-717B(3) were actually a criminal statute-as it is being treated here-Ms. 
Bybee would have been entitled to challenge it as being unconstitutionally vague. 1 See, State v. 
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486, 80 P.3d 1083, 1087 (2003) (criminal statutes must plainly and 
unmistakably provide fair notice of what is prohibited and what is allowed in language persons 
of ordinary intelligence will understand). To succeed on an "as-applied" vagueness challenge, 
Ms. Bybee would have had to show that LC. § 32-717B(3) failed to provide fair notice that her 
conduct was prohibited or that it failed to provide sufficient guidelines to prevent discriminatory 
enforcement. See, State v. Kelley, 361 P.3d 1280, 1285, 2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 116, *4 (Ct. 
App. 2015) citing State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,265 P.3d 519 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Mr. Thompson's own testimony demonstrates that LC. § 32-717B(3) fails to provide 
either fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or sufficient guidelines to prevent discriminatory 
enforcement. He first testified that he believes that joint legal custody requires the parties to 
come to an agreement on all decisions regarding Ashby's well-being. (Tr. p.31, Ls. 7-17.) In 
addition to being legally untenable (see, Carr v. Pridgen, 157 Idaho 238, 243, 335 P.3d 578, 583, 
(2014) discussing inefficacy of court order that purported to require the parties to reach an 
agreement) this understanding also contradicts Mr. Thompson's conclusion that he did not 
violate joint legal custody by taking Ashby out of state \vithout Ms. Bybee's knowledge or 
consent. (See, Tr. p.34 Ls. 4-24.) In apparent recognition of the contradiction, Mr. Thompson 
1 Iv1s. Bybee would have also relied upon the Rule ofLenity. See, e.g., State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322,326, 193 
P.3d 869, 873 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When it is a criminal statute that is at issue, the court must construe the statute 
strictly and in favor of the defendant."). 




included the Order, that language still does not clearly prohibit the alleged misconduct. This 
case is not unlike Carr v. Pridgen, 157 Idaho 238, 335 P.3d 578 (2014). In Pridgen, the 
magistrate held the respondent in contempt for unilaterally enrolling her child in school in 
violation of an order stating that major decisions about the child's education, "(such as which 
school they will attend) will be made by Both Parents." 157 Idaho at 241, 335 P.3d at 581 nl. 
The magistrate found a violation because "if one person, on their own, unilaterally decides where 
the child is going to go, that's a violation of the joint legal custody." Id. 157 Idaho at 243, 335 
P.3d at 583. This Court reversed the magistrate because the allegedly-violated provision was 
"silent as to the parties' duties in the event of a failure to reach agreement as to [the child's] 
education." Id. 
Here, the purported command to share decision-making authority is actually less clear 
than the order in Pridgen. Mr. Thompson interprets this purposed command to mean that the 
parties sharing joint legal custody must discuss a matter relating to the child's general welfare 
before any action is taken relative to the matter. He fails to explain, however, why the command 
does not actually say that. Ms. Bybee cannot be held in contempt for violating Mr. Thompson's 
interpretationofl.C. § 32-717B(3). 
Finally, Mr. Thompson's understanding of joint legal custody has the absurd result of 
increasing Ms. Bybee's criminal liability: if Mr. Thompson had sole legal custody over Ashby, 
Idaho law still would have empowered Ms. Bybee to consent to her daughter's marriage, but she 
would not have been subject to the vague requirements imposed by 'joint legal custody." I.C. § 
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custody in this case only served to punish Ms. Bybee. Even if the definition of joint legal 
custody, as expressed by the legislature, were somehow incorporated into the Order, Ms. 
Bybee's conviction must still be vacated because the definition does not clearly and 
unequivocally prohibit her alleged misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislature's definition of joint legal custody is not a judgment, order or process of 
the court, and it does not provide a "catch-all" command that aggrieved parents can use to 
prosecute contempt actions. Even assuming, however, that the legislature's definition is fully 
incorporated into the allegedly-violated Order, it is not sufficiently clear to put Ms. Bybee on 
notice that consenting to her daughter's marriage could result in the imposition of criminal 
sanctions. Defendants in contempt actions simply cannot be forced to guess at the meaning of 
the allegedly-violated order. Ms. Bybee respectfully requests, therefore, that this Court vacate 
the judgment of the district court affirming the magistrate's finding of contempt. Ms. Bybee also 
requests that costs be awarded to her pursuant to I. C. § 7-610 so that the cost of this private suit 
is not borne entirely by the public. Oral argument is not requested. 
Respectfully submitted this~ay of August, 2016. 
Iord ~. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be served a correct copy of the Appellant's Reply Brief on thi~y 
of August 2016 by sending it to: 
Jon Thompson 
c/o Anthony Pantera, Attorney for Mr. Thompson 
by fax to the following number: (208) 331-1202 
Jessica Vipperman 
Ada County Public Defender-Legal Assistant 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 6 
